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Through the lens of Merleau-Ponty: advancing the
phenomenological approach to nursing research
Sandra P. Thomas PhD RN FAAN
University

of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA

Abstract

Phenomenology has proved to be a popular methodology for nursing
research. I argue, however, that phenomenological nursing research
could be strengthened by greater attention to its philosophical under
pinnings. Many research reports devote more page space to procedure
than to the philosophy that purportedly guided it. The philosophy of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is an excellent fit for nursing, although his work
has received less attention than that of Husserl and Heidegger. In this
paper, I examine the life and thought of Merleau-Ponty, with emphasis
on concepts, such as perception, intentionality and embodiment, which
have particular relevance to the discipline of nursing.
Keywords: phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty, perception, intentionality,
embodiment, nursing research.

How remote from their clumsy pride was the task which
they considered insignificant and left in dust and must - the
task of description - although the subtlest fingers and senses
can scarcely be subtle enough for it. (Friedrich Nietzsche)

Phenomenological research methodology is devoted
to that 'task of description' of which Nietzche spoke.
When well written, the report of a phenomenological
study can move readers to tears. Such a report can
take clinicians into the Iifeworld of their patients in a
deeper way, often producing astonishment as well as
empathy and compassion. Nursing studies conducted
from a phenomenological stance have yielded' com-
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pelling descriptions of the lived experience of diverse
disease conditions (e.g. addiction, anorexia, arthritis,
cancer) and symptoms (e,g. air hunger, chronic
pain, urinary incontinence), as weU as more elusive
phenomena such as courage and caring (Koch,
1995; Carpenter et al., 1999). I argue, however, that
phenomenological nursing research could be strength
ened by greater attention to its philosophical under
pinnings. The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
provides an excellent philosophical base for advancing
nursing research, and I seek to kindle excitement
about it among other scholars. I begin by describing
my personal odyssey as a researcher.

Discarding the mechanistic lens
For much of modern nursin'g's history, medicine's
mechanistic lens for seeing phenomena also was nurs
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ing's lens. Patients' bodies were viewed as malfu
nctioning machines and their complaints as problems
to be solved using a linear hypothetico-deductive
thought process. Likewise, nursing research pro
ceeded from specifying a 'problem' to operationaliz
ing discrete, measurable variables such as 'stress', to
statistical testing of the null hypothesis (Thomas &
Pollio, 2002). I became dissatisfied with this approach
when my programme of research began to focus on
women's stress and anger. For example, no question
naire measures women's vicarious stress, which
proved to be the stressor of greatest magnitude for
women in a study by my research team (Thomas,
1993). Study participants had completed a well
validated and reliable stress instrument, but an open
ended question ultimately revealed the shortcomings
of this instrument. The open-ended question, added
almost as an afterthought, permitted the women to
describe their greatest distress in their own words.
What most troubled my study participants were
events happening to their significant others, such as
the impending divorce of a son, job problems of a
husband, illness of a sister or friend. In these stressful
circumstances the women suffered empathically
along with their loved ones but had little or no control
over what was transpiring. Vicarious stress was not
amenable to traditional stress management strategies
directed toward marshalling personal resources and
gaining mastery. It fuelled a chronic, impotent anger.
I realized that the nature of this stress, and the con
comitant anger, of these women would not have been
revealed by any of the commonly utilized instru
ments. To understand what they felt, I needed to
plumb the complexities of their relational commit
ments to partners, friends, and extended families. I
needed to invite them to describe their experience in
an unfettered manner, telling their stories of emo
tional distress with all'the inherent messiness that
cannot be neatly operationalized and factor-analysed.
Experiences such as this led me to phenomenolog
ical methodology. Before the ink was dry on my first
book about women's anger (Thomas, 1993), based
largely on quantitative research data, I had formed a
new research team and plunged into phenomenolog
ical i~vestigation. I was soon stunned by the realiza
tion that the quantitative project had completely

missed an essential dimension of women's anger
experience: the intermingling of deep hurt with their
anger. Women often said, 'I don't know if I'm more
angry or hurt; I'm hurt and angry.' (Thomas et al.,
1998) The hurt emanated from violations of an
implicit relational contract that women understood to
be present between themselves and their significant
others. What women expected was reciprocity in their
close relationships. When others let them down, their
emotional response was an amalgam of painful
feelings - feelings that were often suppressed for
fear of alienating intimates or causing relationship
termination. These research findings had significant
implications for extant cognitive-behavioural anger
management interventions, none of which addressed
these complexly interwoven aspects of women's
anger. None of the 'valid and reliable' anger instru
ments had permitted discovery of these findings.
So I became a 'convert' to phenomenology, but well
aware of my limitations and hungry for greater
knowledge. Long a reader of existential philosophers
such as Kierkegaard, Camus, and Sartre, I felt com
fortable with existential tenets. But I had been
trained solely as a quantitative researcher. What did
I know about qualitative research methodology?
What did I know about phenomenology? It is said
that when the learner is ready, the teacher will
appear. I had actually taken a course in existential
phenomenology as a doctoral student and enjoyed
my first dabbling in the work of Merleau-Ponty
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945), but at the time I was thor
oughly captivated by beta weights, Bonferronis and
significant Fs. As the years passed, sometimes I would
see my teacher around campus. He would ask what I
was studying, and he would gently suggest that phe
nomenological interviews might be revelatory.
Finally, I heard what he was saying. One day, 15 years
after the first course, I enrolled in his class again, and
Merleau-Ponty now made so much more sense. I
experienced an epiphany. I was home. I have been
immersed in existential phenomenology ever since, at
first a mere novice in my professor's weekly research
group, then a collaborator, and finally a coleader. Our
interdisciplinary group has been meeting weekly for
12 years now. There is something very special about
our Tuesday afternoon meetings. About 15-20 faculty
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and students from nursing, education, psychology,
geography, exercise science and other disciplines
gather together for the reading of phenomenological
interview transcripts. Enthusiasm about our approach
has been kindled in dozens of colleagues and stu
dents, some of whom contributed to our 2002 book,
Listening to Patients (Thomas & Pollio, 2002).

Why choose phenomenology for the
study of emotion?
I contend that only within existential phenomenol
ogy has emotion been given a central place in human
existence (Heidegger, 1927; Sartre & Frechtman,
1939). Earlier philosophies tended to view emotion
as inferior to reason; being 'emotional' led to mis
takes, madness and sin. Within existential phenome
nology, the various forms of being emotional are
viewed as diverse ways of being-in-the-world (Fis
cher et ai., 1989), and the phenomenologist is inter
ested in their meanings. Sartre was one of the first to
offer an account of emotion, proposing that emotion
is the way consciousness changes the world from
deterministic to magical (Sartre, 1939). For example,
an emotion like anger could be used strategically, to
achieve one's ends when faced with the struggles and
difficulties of a deterministic world. Emotions are
gestalts that move us to action; they cannot be
reduced to physiological alterations or motor
behaviours (Sartre, 1939). Yet much contemporary
research focuses on discrete aspects of emotion such
as changes in facial musculature or neurotransmit
ters. Pribram has commented on this trend, 'It was
not so very long ago that I attended a symposium on
"emotion" at an international congress in Madrid.
The participants discussed factor analysis, limbic
neuroanatomy, and operant conditioning. Some
where in the agenda emotions were hidden from
view, lurking in the dark alleys of our ignorance. No
one even dared used the term' (Pribram et at., 1980,
p. 246). It is time to uncover the meanings of anger,
stress and depression from the first-person perspec
tive of individuals experiencing these feelings. Per
haps they have value and purpose. Existential
phenomenology offers a way to engage in respectful
dialogue with people and glean richly nuanced and
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contextualized descriptions of their emotions. While
other qualitative approaches employ a dialog~cal
method, what is unique here is the specific philo
sophical lens.

Choosing the specific philosophical
lens for the study of emotion
To enable me to see emotional phenomena freshly,
I chose a new lens derived from the philosophy
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). I
liked his antireductionist and antipositivist stance. I
liked his explicit rejection of Cartesian mind-b0dy
dualism. He contended that the T which thinks is
inseparable from his body and his lived situation; a
person is an indissoluble unity. In contrast to Heideg
ger, whose focus was on the abstract nature of being,
Merleau-Ponty was concerned with a science of
human beings (Cohen, 1987). The specific aim of his
phenomenology was to give a direct description, not
a causal explanation, of experience. Merleau-Ponty
exhorted us to examine the immediacy of experience
before it is objectified by science. He believed that
true philosophy is relearning to see the world. Thus,
he urged us to be astonished by the world, to see it
with open and wondering eyes.
Merleau-Ponty (1908-61) was a contemporary of
philosophical luminaries such as Husserl, Sartre,
and Heidegger. In early 20th century Europe,
immersed in the horror of two world wars being
fought in their own lands, it is not surprising that
these German and French philosophers were grap
pling with issues of anxiety, death, freedom, respon
sibility and the very meaning of human existence. A
remote and abstract philosophy could no longer be
satisfying to them. Their personal experiences
undoubtedly provided impetus for their philosophi
cal musings. Thus, it is important to note that Mer
leau-Ponty served in the French army in World War
II and suffered imprisonment and torture by the
Germans (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). Just as we must
seek to understand the situational context of our
research participants' - and patients' - experiences,
so also we must consider the writings of phenome
nological philosophers in light of the war-torn lifew
orld into which they had been thrust. For that
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reason, we will delve further into key events of
Merleau-Ponty's life a bit later.

Origins and evolution of
phenomenology
Phenomenology had origina ted in German philoso
phy but soon gained adherents in other European
countries such as France, Belgium and Holland. The
historical evolution of the phenomenological move
ment has been ably traced by others (Spiegelberg,
1981; Cohen, 1987; Reeder, 1987). The movement has
been characterized as a 'set of waves' (Reeder, 1987)
in a vast groundswell of 'antireductionist and anticon
structionist' thinking that had begun in the nine
teenth century (Spiegelberg, 1981, p. xi). No unity was
achieved within this European intellectual move
ment, although there was a common aversion to the
prevailing mechanistic research paradigm of the
behaviourists. Much of the European work was
unknown for some time in the English-speaking
world, including that of Merleau-Ponty, whose work
was first translated into English relatively recently in
1962 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945).

Phenomenology in nursing
Articles on phenomenology began to appear in the
nursing literature in the 1970s, with early treatises by
Paterson & Zderad (1976), Parse (1981), Oiler (1982)
and Ornery (1983). Over the ensuing decades, phe
nomenology has become quite popular. Although a
number of nurses now call themselves phenomenol
ogists, there is considerable diversity amongst us.
According to Caelli (2000),18 different forms of phe
nomenology have been identified. Dominant within
nursing literature have been Husserlian phenomenol
ogy, Heideggerian phenomenology and variants of
the 'Dutch school'. What nurses in America, Australia
and other western countries are doing today under
the putative umbrella of phenomenology is very dif
ferent from the solitary reflections of twentieth cen
tury European philosophers. While Crotty (1996)
accused contemporary nurse scholars of misinterpret
ing. European phenomenological philosophy, Caelli
(2000) contended that deliberate choices were made

to develop new ways of applying phenomenological
philosophy to inquiry. Drew (2001, p. 16), speaking of
the legacy of Husserl's ideas, reminded us that it is
the task of researchers to decide 'how ... philosophic
ideas are put into action'. Silverman (1987, p. 6) com
mended the new generation of American phenome
nological researchers who are marking out 'clear and
original paths'. But clarity regarding these 'paths' is
lacking in many published reports of phenomenolog
ical nursing research. To wit, the link between
procedural aspects of a study and its philosophical
underpinnings is often unclear to the reader. Despite
the lip service paid to Husserl, Heidegger and other
philosophers by nurse researchers, many reports of
phenomenological research devote more page space
to procedure than to the philosophy that purportedly
guided it (Porter, 1998). There is no mention of
the underlying philosophical perspective in some
research reports. For example, a researcher may
speak of using Colaizzi's 'steps' (Colaizzi et al., 1978),
making no reference to the Husserlian inspiration for
his analytic scheme. Especially popular within nurs
ing has been this set of steps developed by Colaizzi,
a psychology graduate student, while doing his 1973
doctoral dissertation on learning at Duquesne
(Colaizzi, 1973). Nursing's prolonged allegiance to
Colaizzi is puzzling. Other than a book chapter in a
1978 text by Valle and Halling (Colaizzi et al., 1978),
I find no evidence that Colaizzi ever published any
thing else. Apparently he did not remain active in
phenomenological scholarship.
Six years ago, Porter (1998, pp. 26, 27) called upon
nurse scholars to 'demonstrate allegiance to our cho
sen philosophies rather than adherence to proce
dure'. She described her own experience of 'being
inspired' by Husserl. I have been similarly inspired by
the works of Merleau-Ponty. Elsewhere, with my
mentor Howard Pollio, I have written about proce
dural aspects of the phenomenological research
method that was developed at the University of Ten
nessee (Thomas & Pollio, 2002) and first introduced
by Pollio et al. (1997). Here, I focus mainly on the
philosophy that guides our work. I examine the life
and thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with empha
sis on the material of particular relevance to my pro
gramme of research and to the discipline of nursing.
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My hope is that this introduction to the man and his
ideas will stimulate other nurse scholars to seek addi
tional information. We begin by examining biograph
ical data regarding the key events and people who
influenced his philosophy.

A brief biography of Merleau-Ponty
Curiously, given his international prominence, there
is no book-length biography of Merleau-Ponty. The
facts that follow were gleaned, bit by bit, from a
variety of sources. Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born
on the west coast of France in 1908. War touched
his life early, as hjs father, an army officer, was
killed in action during World War 1. Despite the loss
of his father, his childhood, spent living with his
mother and one sister, was said to be idyllic
(McBride et al., 2001). He was educated in the
French Iycee system and then studied philosophy at
the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, where he
conducted postgraduate work on the nature of per
ception and met Sartre, a profound influence on his
life (Priest, 1998). The remainder of his life was
spent as a teacher jn the Iycee system and in various
universities. Along with Sartre and other French
philosophers, he began his career studying the work
of Husser! (Moran, 2000). He heard Husserl lecture
in 1929 and later travelled to the Husserlian
Archives to examine unpublished papers. Although
he ultimately rejected certain aspects of Husserl's
thought, he retained Husserl's descriptive approach
to phenomena and combined it with an existential
ground, deriving, in part, from Hejdegger (Thomas
& Pollio, 2002). His existentialist ideas are also
attributed to his close association with Sartre and
Camus (Priest, 1998). The relationship with Sartre
has been the topic of numerous essays. According
to most accounts, the two men greatly enjoyed
matching wits in long intellectual discussions. While
in agreement about many points, Merleau-Ponty
was more concerned with science than was Sartre
(Cohen, 1987).
Although some say that Merleau-Ponty was him
self a behaviourist - having once uttered kind words
about John Watson (Pollio et aI., 1997) - his first
book took issue with behaviourism. In The Structure
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of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1942), he asserted that
no piece of behaviour may be reduced to its alle,ged
parts. He pointed out the ambiguity of behaviour,
contending that any behaviour may be given various
interpretations from the perspective of the actor or
the third person observer (Priest, 1998). Ambiguity
was to become a continuing thread throughout his
work, Later, he explained that ambiguity prevails
both in perception and in self-knowledge. Tune itself
is not an objective dimension of the world, but is
ambiguous.
In his most famous book, The Phenomenology of
Perception (hereafter abbreviated as PP) (Merleau
Ponty, 1945), Merleau-Ponty devoted painstaking
attention to everyday human activities and situa
tions. This focus was ilivergent from traditional phi
losophy. In PP, he sought to refute both
empiricism and what he called 'i'ntellectualism',
willch is more commonly tenned idealism. Empiri
cism is flawed because it ignores the subjective;
intellectualism is flawed because tillngs are only
understood intellectually, and the world' is reduced
to ideas. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, 'empiri
cism cannot see that we need to know what we are
looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for
it, and intellectualism fajls to see that we need to
be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally
again we should not be searching' (Merleau-Ponty,
1945, p. 28). We will have more to say about PP
later.
The outbreak of World War II disrupted Mer
leau-Ponty's research and greatly afiected his view
of freedom and other people. He concluded that
everyone is compromised in war (Moran, 2000). In
his role as a second lieutenant in the infantry, he
was required to call for artillery barrages or ajr
attacks on enemy positions. As noted earher, he
was captured and tortured by the Germans. After
the war, in Sense and Nonsense (Merleau-Ponty,
1948), he wrote movingly of the changes in his val
ues that ensued from these experiences. In Human
ism and Terror, he wrote about what it means to
be a collaborator, a traitor, or a revolutionary
(Merleau-Ponty, 1947). In the early postwar years,
he became involved in radicaI'politics. In 1945 Mer
leau-Ponty and Sartre collaborated in founding a
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journal. In Sartre's words, 'We [were] hunters of
meaning, we would speak the truth about the world
and about our own lives' (Moran, 2000, p. 397).
Deploring capitalism's protection of privileged
groups, the two philosophers sought answers in
Marxism and Communism. But Merleau-Ponty
began to view Sartre's support of Stalin with dis
may. By 1952, significant differences between the
two caused an acrimonious split, with Merleau
Ponty resigning from the journal staff. One bone of
contention was the journal's propensity for taking
what Merleau-Ponty called 'on-the-fly' positions
about political events. He felt that the journal
should maintain a more philosophical tone, i.e. 'try
to reach the reader's head rather than heart' (Belay
& Davis, 2001, p. 42). The immediate impetus for
Merleau-Ponty's resignation, however, was Sartre's
stated intent to prevent the journal from publishing
one of his essays.
As Merleau-Ponty became increasingly disillu
sioned with both Marxism and Communism, with
drawing from the political fray, Sartre accused him of
abdicating bis responsibility. Recently translated let
ters are illuminating (Belay & Davis, 2001). In a 1953
letter, Sartre chided: 'I blame you ... for abdicating
in the midst of circumstances where you have to
decide as a man, as French, as citizen, and as intellec
tual - by taking your "philosophy" as an alibi' (Belay
& Davis, 2001, p. 35). In his response, Merleau-Ponty
asserted, 'I have' never wavered on my wish to do
philosophy, and I told you so, one day around 1948,
when you asked me why I did not give up
teaching.... I have decided, since the Korean War, to
stop writing on events as they happen' (Belay &
Davis, 2001, p. 40). The split between the two men
was emotionally painful for both, as shown in their
1953 letters. Merleau-Ponty deplored the 'glacial
tone' and 'irate tone' Sartre used when making com
ments to· him about his recent lectures and essays.
Sartre defended himself by saying, 'If I might have
seemed glacial, it is because I have always had a sort
of shyness when it comes to congratulating' (Belay &
Davis, 2001, p. 56) and he admitted that 'I am
unhappy that we disagree' (Belay & Davis, 2001, p.
57). -Interested readers may want to seek out this
exchange of letters between the two philosophers,

which provide not only some insight into what Sartre
called the 'emptying of the abscess' in their strained
personal relationship (Belay & Davis, 2001, p. 55) but
also a glimpse of the tensions in the world in the first
phase of the Cold War.
In 1953, at the age of 45. Merleau-Ponty achieved
the distinction of being the youngest person ever to
be elected the chair of philosophy at the College de
France. During the 1950s he was rethinking much
of his earlier work. According to Moran (2000), he
had become especially interested in the problem of
reciprocal relations and communications with oth
ers (intersubjectivity). In his last book, The Visible
and the Invisible, published posthumously, he
showed a new interest in ontological questions,
such as the 'subject-object question' (Merleau
Ponty,1964).
Dissatisfied with language that perpetuated dual
ism and dichotomies, he introduced new terms, such
as intertwining, which described the inseparability of
subject from world, and chiasm, which described the
'place in the flesh of the world where the visible flesh
also sees, where the tangible flesh also touches, and
so on.... TIlis only happens at the location in this
fleshly element where there is a person. The sculpture
does not feel or see itself or the other objects in the
room around it. ... TIlliS, perception and sensation
are a kind of doubling of the flesh of the world upon
itself. One could think of it as the wave when it breaks
and curls over. It is the place in the wave where the
water touches itself' (Young & Davis, 2001, p. 114).
Unfortunately, he did not complete this ambitious
undertaking. Before his sudden death in 1961, he had
finished only a few chapters of the book, although
others were subsequently assembled from his notes.
As McBride notes, 'I am sure that Merleau-Ponty's
thought would have developed in exciting new
directions ... that might well have complemented
some of the new directions taken by Sartre during the
years in which he outlived his former colleague'
(McBride el al., 2001, p. 73). In my searches of the
literature, I have not found a cause of death for Mer
leau-Ponty.The event of his death is tinged with irony,
as he collapsed while rereading Descartes in prepara
tion for a class he was to deliver the next day (Priest,
1998). He was only 53.
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Key tenets of Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy with relevance to
nursing
Perception

The nurse researcher who works within the Merleau
Ponty tradition seeks to discover study participants'/
patients' perceptions of their lived experience. Mer
leau-Ponty's philosophy was first and always a phe
nomenology of perception. He felt that traditional
philosophy misunderstood the role of perception in
the formation of awareness and experience. It is per
ception that opens us to reality, providing a direct
experience of the events, objects and phenomena of
the world. 111is direct experience is to be contrasted
with thinking and language, which deal with ideas and
representations of the world (Thomas & Pollio, 2002).
All knowledge takes place within the horizons
opened up by perception, and all meaning occurs
through perception. Perception is learned in an
embodied, communal environment. Humans are
born into a particular sociohistorical and cultural
milieu, and immediately embedded in what Merleau
Ponty called a 'knot of relations' that includes 'all
those we have loved, detested, known or simply
glimpsed' (Switzer & Davis, 2001, p. 283).
As children grow, they readily absorb the norms
and practices of their culture. Because of shared cul
tural understandings, perception of a given entity can
not be fully understood without knowing something
of the specific culture. For example, a Japanese wife
may express her anger toward her husband by creat
ing a disorderly flower arrangement. The husband's
ability to perceive the symbolic meaning of that
flower arrangement is predicated on his understand
ing of the culturally prescribed, precise way that
flowers should be placed in their container and the
proscription against direct expression of a disruptive
emotion such as anger in Japanese society. An Amer
ican husband seeing the same flowers would not per
ceive them in the same way.
Phenomena appear to us as meaningful wholes. But
perceived things, according to Merleau-Ponty, are
always perceived as having a certain figure or form
against a background (Moran, 2000). To explain this
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principle, the familiar black-and-white illustration of
the vase and two faces is often used, in which a focus
on the white portion reveals the vase and a focus on
the black portions on each side reveals two faces
confronting one another (Thomas & Pollio, 2002).
Similarly, figure and ground cocreate each other in
human experiences: 'There are no figures by them
selves: All figural aspects of (perceptual) experience
emerge against some ground that serves to delineate
its specific experiential form' (Pollio eta!., 1997, p.
13). What stands out as figural or focal to a person
cannot be fully understood without consideration of
many different existential grounds. Thus, we must
consider the major grounds: Body, Time, Other Peo
ple, and World (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). Our research
method seeks a complete and careful description of
both the figural and background aspects of the phe
nomenon we are investigating. The emotion of anger,
for example, cannot be understood without a grasp of
both its relational and cultural context. It is an intense
bodily experience as well. It is important to note,
however. that the researcher does not use a struc
tured interview protocol to probe for these contexts;
instead, the angry person is asked, 'What aspects of
the experience stand out to you?'
The interviewee's narrative reveals what is figural
to him. The bodily aspects of a phenomenon may
compel the attention of some respondents while
other aspects of the experience, such as Time or
World, may be indistinct or fuzzy. In. a study of
chronic pain, for example, patients seldom talked
about the World (Thomas, 2000). Pain had impris
oned them, creating separation from the world. They
used terms such as locked off, roped off and caged off
to depict this imprisonment that created distance
from other people and the world. As one participant
explained, 'I feel like I'm on this island all by myself'
(Thomas, 2000, p. 692).
Figure and ground may 'change places' many times
during repeated experiences of a phenomenon. In the
aforementioned study of chronic pain, searing pain
was sometimes figural, obliterating a patient's aware
ness of everything but the hurting body (Thomas,
2000). On other occasions, the pain receded to a dull
ache; although constant, it did not dominate con
sciousness (i.e. was no longer figural). As the body
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became 'ground', the individual could emerge from

'The reason for the neglect of the body in philosophy lies

the isolation of the pain, go out into the world and
connect with other people again.

deep in the tradition of Western thought ... From Plato to
Descartes and modern idealism, the belief has been that the
true self or the real man is somehow within, and that the
body is an appendage or a framework of some sort'.

Intentionality

Descartes argued that
The literature indicates some confusion with the term

intentionality as Merleau-Ponty used it.
What he was referring to was not plans or planning,
as in common parlance, but relatedness to the world,
the integral interconnectedness between humans and
the life world in which attention of humans is always
directed toward specific events, objects and phenom
ena (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). We are never simply
passive before the stimuli in the life world. We are
engaged 'receptors' of stimuli. All experience takes
place in relation to something other than itself.
'Understanding the meaning of some experience
requires us to describe the intentional stance (or sit
uated perspective) of the event from the point of view
of the experiencing person' (Pollio et al., 1997, p. 8).
Thomas & Pollio (2002, p. 14) provide a maxim to
help researchers grasp the concept of intentionality:
'What I am aware of reveals what is meaningful to
me. If, for example, I enter a room and notice only
the furniture, I probably am a very different person
from someone else who enters the room and notices
only the children, the food, or the artwork.' Drew
(2001) recommends that researchers consider our
own intentionality (i.e. what we find meaningful, how
we are connected to the topics that we study). We
accomplish this through the process of bracketing
(Thomas & Pollio, 2002), although Merleau-Ponty
reminds that it is not possible to completely bracket
all of our personal interests, assumptions and presup
positions. Bracketing is an ongoing process through
out the course of a study.

Embodiment

Of Merleau-Ponty's

concepts,

embodiment

has

attracted the most attention from nurse scholars.
'Merleau-Ponty is possibly the single philosopher who
has done the most to draw our attention to the per
vasive importance of embodiment' (Young & Davis,
2001, p. 101). As MacQuarrie (1973, p. 93) notes,

'being able to think constitutes our essence; ... that the
mind is disembodied; and ... therefore, that the essence of
human beings, that which makes us human, has nothing to
do with our bodies' (Lakoff & Johnson. 1999, p. 400).
According to Lakoff & Johnson (1999), these Car
tesian tenets influenced not only philosophy but edu
cation and popular culture, leading to the dissociation
of reason from emotion and the downplaying and
devaluing of emotional life. Much of the contempo
rary anger management literature exhorts readers to
employ rational thought to control - even banish 
the emotion of anger. Anger is branded as dangerous
and irrational, especially for women. If enacted, this
advice would require us to ignore the wisdom of the
angry body. But anger is generated by significant vio
lations of beliefs, values, or rights. The body's arousal
is powerful, a call to movement and to words that will
protect one's boundaries and defend one's rights.
When silenced, the angry body remains in turmoil.
Women in our study used terms such as simmering,
stewing and festering to describe the agitation pro
duced by anger. As noted by one research participant,
the body hurts when anger is suppressed: 'I can tell if
my anger takes the form
I hold anger for a while
of stress in my neck
it's hidden but my body
knows' (Thomas et al., 1998, p. 315). The suppressed
anger builds over time in the body. One woman used
the metaphor of 'a big ball' to describe its accumula
tion: 'It's like you build up so much anger
inside ... without really sitting down and talking
about the problem that it just rolls up into a big ball
and you're not even sure what it's really about' (Tho
mas et al., 1998, p. 316). Study participants described
a sense of powerlessness when they did not express
their anger but confined it within the body. Our
research suggests that instead of stifling anger.
women must acknowledge the wisdom of their bodies
and act on their anger to achieve conditions of justice
and equity (Thomas et al., 1998).
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To return to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, the
human body is not an appendage or a thing in the
Cartesian sense. The body is the fundamental cate
gory of human existence; it exists before there is
thought (Pollio ec at., 1997). The body is, of course,
the unwavering vantage point of perception. The
body, however, not only perceives but also gestures
and speaks. It moves through a world of objects that
it can use for its various purposes. The body conveys
qualities of objects, such as their weight. It gives
meaning to the space around itself. As the body
grows, the meaning of space becomes modified. What
is high for a child is no longer high for an adult.
Of particular relevance to nurses is Merleau
Ponty's distinction between the 'body object', the
body of medicine, and the 'lived body' or 'body sub
ject', the body of personal experience. It is not sur
prising that medical students come to perceive the
body as 'object', because they begin learning about it
through dissection of cadavers. Watson (1999) relates
that one medical school professor actually introduced
his students to the human body by writing 'dead
mammal' on the blackboard the first day of class. In
contrast to this dehumanizing and objectifying stance,
Merleau-Ponty reminds us of the sacredness of the
body. If we view the body as sacred, 'it [is] impossible
for us to treat a face or a body, even a dead body, like
a thing. They are sacred entities' (Moran, 2000, p.
415).
When the relationship between body and world is
disturbed, a person's existence is profoundly shaken.
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this throughout PP with
accounts of injured, disabled people, such as
Schneider, who can no longer organize their world
(Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1945). Schneider, a World
War I veteran, is unable to make certain arm move
ments in the research laboratory because of his
wounds. However, he is able to move his arm while
doing factory work. Merleau-Ponty takes the reader
through a penetrating analysis of this paradox, show
ing that neither a rationalist nor an empiricist expla
nation will suffice. Merleau-Ponty's insights about the
body are of great significance both to philosophy,
which has been slow to devote attention to the body,
and to nursing, which has intimate knowledge of the
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impaired body but seldom pauses for philosophical
reflection about it.

Relationships with other people: the 'knot of
relations'

Many existential philosophers seemed to have a
rather dark view of humanity, espousing individual
ism and writing disparagingly of the 'crowd, the herd,
the mass' (MacQuarrie, 1973, p. 122). In contrast,
Merleau-Ponty saw the benefits of connecting with
other people. He reminded us that newborn infants
are first orientated toward their mother's face, not
toward objects in the world; the first 'objects' the
infant sees are smiles (Moran, 2000). Life thereafter
is spent in a 'knot' or network of relations. When
referring to the Other, Merleau-Ponty used terms
such as 'my double' or 'my twin', indicating an egali
tarian stance. Unlike Sartre, who saw in the social
world the potential for conflict 'epitomized in the
sweaty, mundane, empirically describable boxing
match' (McBride et at., 2001, p. 82), Merleau-Ponty
saw the potential for dialogue, through which persons
receive recognition and affirmation. Unlike Heideg
gel', who warned that other people distract from the
pursuit of authentic being, Merleau-Ponty did not see
others as impediments, rather as fellow travellers in
life's journey (Pollio et aI., 1997). He spoke of the
intersections of his path, and the path of other people:
'my own and other people's [paths] intersect and
engage each other like gears' (Merleau-Ponty, 1945,
p. xx). Recently, the daily intersections of nurses and
patients have commanded the interest of several
members of our phenomenological research team
and revealed some surprising - and disturbing 
findings.
In one study, hospitalized patients longed for
deeper connection with nurses and other caregivers,
but more often they experienced disconnectedness.
For example, a study participant commented on the
timing and irrelevance of questions by a nurse when
the participant was in active labour. The nurse,
focused on her task of filling in all the blanks on an
assessment form, was not attuned to the figural
aspect of the patient's experience (her uterine
contractions):
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She stood on that side at one point during my labour and
was asking me questions. And it was like, 'Have you had any
stress in your life?' I'm having a baby! I think she meant
have you moved recently or changed jobs, blah, blah, blah.
It was funny, she would ask me questions, and I would be in
the middle of a contraction and I'd say 'Can I answer that
in a minute?'

(Shattell, 2002, p. 225)

In this interaction between nurse and patient, com
mon ground was not achieved. Dialogue, as described
by Merleau-Ponty, did not take place. Merleau-Ponty
asserted that 'In the experience of dialogue, there is
constituted between the other person and myself a
common ground; my thought and his are interwoven
into a single fabric.... We have here a dual being,
where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of
behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we
are collaborators for each other in consummate reci
procity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and
we coexist through a common world' (Merleau-Ponty,
1945, p. 354).
In contrast to the disconnectedness in the previous
vignette, Benner (2001, p. 68) shared an example in
which the nurse, despite her patient's initial belliger
ence, did persist in gaining the patient's trust and
engaging her in dialogue:
I was making my rounds. And I walked in and I said, 'Hi,
I'm Sue. You must be Ann' And she said, 'What the hell is
it to you? I'm so goddamned mad.' I ... said, 'Well, why
don't you tell me about it?' I knew trom the beginning that
there was such pain under her vile language - such intensity,

Time
Earlier, we made reference to the ambiguity of Time
in Merleau-Ponty's writings. Time is a subjective
experience, not 'a system of objective positions
through which we pass but a mobile setting that
moves toward and away from us' (Pollio et ai., 1997,
p. 160). Awareness of time depends on events that
happen; events are subjective, not objective (Priest,
1998). Merleau-Ponty spoke of the 'bursting forth' of
time - by analogy with a flowering plant bursting
from its pod. In much of everyday life, minutes and
hours pass mindlessly; Time only periodically bursts
into consciousness. For example, a patient hearing a
physician pronounce the diagnosis of terminal cancer
may have a sudden awareness of the brevity of the
life span. From that point on, he may engage in a
frantic struggle to 'make the most' of his remaining
days or months. He may be acutely aware of the
choices and limits inherent in this quantity of time.
His focus may shift to a pain-free hour, or a few
moments in the sunshine, and it is often the nurse who
provides these comforts during the terminal illness.
The unit of time most salient to Merleau-Ponty is the
present. In a letter to Sartre, he explicated the differ
ences between the two philosophers' views of time:
'You have a facility to construct and inhabit the future
that is all yours. I tend to live in the present, leaving
it undecidable and open, as it is.... My relationship
with time happens mostly through the present' (Belay
& Davis. 2001, p. 48).

almost agony. And I didn't even know her history. I didn't
know anything about her ... and over the next month I
found out about the agony and the pain.

Morality

These phenomenological studies provide brief but
fascinating glimpses of the intersecting paths of
nurses and patients. Further studies of the relational
aspects of nursing care would be especially timely,
given the emphasis on speedy execution of tasks in
today's profit-driven health care delivery system.
Current nursing literature is replete with articles
about weary nurses burning out and frightened
patients feeling abandoned. Much remains to be
learned about the meaning-laden situations in which
nurses and patients meet one another and establish a
dialogic connection - or fail to do so.

One can find pervasive references to ambiguity in
Merleau-Ponty's work, suggesting that his philosophy
could provide no guidance regarding the Truth or the
Good. However, he once defined true morality as
'actively being what we are by chance, establishing
that communication with others and with ourselves
for which our temporal structure gives us the oppor
tunity and of which our liberty is only the rough out
line' (Watson & Davis, 2001, p. 201). I find this an
astute guide for a moral and meaningful life. I find it
directly pertinent to the daily practices of nurses in
their local situations, wherever they may be.
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I also find a distinctly moral tone in works such as
Humanism and Terror (Merleau-Ponty, 1947), in
which Merleau-Ponty pointed out the hypOCIisy of
democracy, noting that societies proclaiming respect
for autonomy, dignity and property rights 'were
themselves created by violent conquests and
insurrections ... and maintained by ongoing violence
against exploited classes on foreign soils' (Young &
Davis, 2001, p. 129).
Merleau-Ponty deplored all such violence, envi
sioning a humane social world in which dialogue
would take priority over violence (Madison & Davis,
2001). As Madison has pointed out, Merleau-Ponty
was an early critic of totalitarianism - two decades
before that position became fashionable in France 
instead espousing a politics of 'mutual recognition
and solidarity [that] was in fact the direct anticipation
of the politics of civility championed in our times by
VacJav Havel' (Madison & Davis, 2001, p. 174).

Assessment of Merleau-Ponty's
contribution
If one is trying to pin down Merleau-Ponty, the task

is much like the proverbial impossibility of nailing
down jello. He rejects both historical determinism
and absolute freedom. He rejects relativism and dog
matism as well. He rejects both realism and idealism.
He tells us that meaning is ambiguous, mixed up
with nonmeaning. In his opinion, no amount of
investigation can dispel the ambiguity of the myster
ies of nature, the world, or God. This stance may
create discomfort in nurses who wish to have 'right
answers' to their questions. On the other hand, how
exciting it can be to thoughtfully consider diverse
interpretations of clinical or research data, remain
ing open to the possibility of truly novel ways of
perceiving the familiar. Adherents to the Merleau
Ponty view of human existence must approach the
study participant/patient from the humble stance of
perpetual learner, not authority figure. With a humil
ity uncharacteristic of academics, Merleau-Ponty
referred to himself as the 'philosopher who does not
know'. Whereas Husser! wanted to reduce scientific
phenomena to their foundational prescientific
essence, Mer!eau-Ponty believed that the original
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phenomena lie buried in darkness in such a way that
they cannot be brought to light - although .we can
always erect pointers in the darkness. Our task as
nurse researchers, then, is to erect these pointers.
Porter (2000) likens the phenomenological resear
cher to a heliograph, a device for sending messages
or signalling by flashing the sun's rays from a mirror.
By sending participants' messages to practising
nurses, the researcher enables nurses to vicariously
experience the lifeworld of patients with conditions
such as chronic pain.
Many scholars, both within and outside philosophy,
are discovering, or rediscovering, the work of Mer
leau-Ponty (Priest, 1998; Wilde, 1999; Benner, 2000;
Moran, 2000; Davis, 2001) Some speculate that he
never received the public attention accorded his con
temporaries because of his retiring personality and
difficult language (Moran, 2000). Priest (1998, p. 224)
judged him to possess 'neither the literary talent nor
the political dexterity of Sartre'. Nor does it seem that
he exhibited the charisma of Heidegger. Interestingly,
given his emphasis on description of lived experience,
he remained noncommunicative about his own life,
revealing little about himself (Davis, 2001). For a
time, his work was unfashionable in French intellec
tual circles, although now he is viewed more favour
ably: He is actually considered to have pre-empted
some aspects of postmodern thought. Derrida, among
others, urges reassessing Merleau-Ponty's work
(Davis, 2001).
Perhaps it should not be surprising that it took a
while for American scholars to develop appreciation
of Merleau-Ponty's work, because of the time lag
before many of his writings were translated. By the
time PP was translated into English in 1962, Merleau
Panty was already deceased. English translations of
other books, such as Signs, Prose of the World and
The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty &
Lingis, 1964; Merleau-Ponty & McCleary, 1964; Mer
leau-Ponty & Lefort, 1973), appeared even later.
Lakoff & Johnson (1999, p. xi), in their recent book
Philosophy in the Flesh, paid special tribute both to
Merleau-Ponty and John Dewey: 'Any book with the
words "philosophy" and "flesh" in the title must
express its obvious debt'· to Maurice Merleau
Ponty ... For their day, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty
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were models of what we will refer to as "empirically
responsible philosophers" '.
Wilde (1999) noted ·that scholars from nursing,
medicine, anthropology, education, psychology and
sociology have been exploring embodiment as a new
area for theory development. She predicted that
phenomenological nursing research will reveal the
embodied practices that enable the chronically ill to
surmount the challenges of living with limitations and
assistive technologies. I believe this potential already
has been demonstrated in Wilde's (1999) study of
individuals requiring long-term urinary catheteriza
tion and in recent phenomenological studies of
ventilator-dependent children (Sarvey, 2001) and
patients whose bodies have incorporated implanted
defibrillators (Krau, 2002). In their day-by-day navi
gation of the lifeworld, such patients have acquired
valuable knowledge and innovative skills for coping.
As we tap the wisdom of their bodies, by asking them
to describe their everyday embodied existence, we
can generate new middle-range theories and nursing
interventions to help other chronically ill patients
manage tbeir conditions (Wilde, 1999). Likewise,
phenomenological studies of emotions such as anger
are revealing the intelligence of emotions, thereby
mandating a new stance on traditional therapeutic
approaches that seek to medicate or banish them.

Conclusion
In writing this paper, I was once again reminded of
the truth of Merleau-Ponty's observation that 'writers
experience the excess of what is to be said beyond
their ordinary capacities' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p.
57).
A sense of urgency drove me to put these words on
paper at a time wben my understanding is still incom
plete. But, of course, my understanding will always be
incomplete. I urge others to join the rejuvenated dia
logue about the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Clearly, I believe tbat the ideas of Merleau-Ponty
have abundant potential to advance nursing research.
But phenomenology is not just for researchers. I
believe that ali nurses can practise it as 'a manner or
style .of thinking' (Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1945, p.
viii), learning to listen to patient concerns in a new

way, alert to what is figural in the perceptions of their
patients yet ever-mindful of their embedded ness in a
particular sociocultural context. Being invited by a
nurse to tell one's story surely benefits the patient,
who often feels lost and alone in the juggernaut of the
health care assembly line. Hearing the story enriches
the nurse as well, filling him or her with awe regarding
both the particularistic and the universal dimensions
of human lived experiences of health and illness. 1
find that phenomenology is transformational for
those who practise it.
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